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Costly Enforcement of Voluntary Environmental Agreements with Industries 
Abstract: Although the theoretical literature on the performance of voluntary approaches to 
environmental protection has progressed quite far in the last decade, no one has rigorously 
addressed the obvious point that even voluntary emissions control policies must be enforced. 
This paper examines the consequences of the need for costly enforcement of voluntary 
environmental agreements with industries on the ability of these agreements to meet regulatory 
objectives, the levels of industry participation with these agreements, and the relative efficiency 
of voluntary and regulatory approaches.  We find that enforcement costs that are borne by the 
members of a voluntary emissions control agreement limit the circumstances under which an 
agreement can form in place of an emissions tax. However, if an agreement does form, member-
financed enforcement induces greater participation than if compliance with the agreement could 
be enforced without cost to its members.  Moreover, a voluntary emission control agreement 
with an industry can be a more efficient way to achieve an environmental quality objective than 
an emission tax, but only if: (1) the members of an agreement bear the costs of enforcing 
compliance with the agreement; (2) there exists member-financed agreements that reach the 
government’s environmental quality target while leaving the members of the agreement at least 
as well off as they would be under an emissions tax, and (3) the enforcer of the agreement has a 
significantly better monitoring technology or a higher sanction available to it than the 
government.  
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1. Introduction 
In recent years there has been growing interest in the use of voluntary environmental agreements 
between regulators and polluting industries in place of standard regulatory approaches.  In many 
of these arrangements the government agrees not to impose a costly conventional regulation on 
an industry provided that it can meet an environmental quality objective voluntarily. These forms 
of voluntary agreements are typically referred to as negotiated agreements, and are the most 
common voluntary approach used in Europe (Conrad 2001). Examples include France’s 
Agreement on the Treatment of End-of-Life Vehicles, Germany’s Agreement on Global 
Warming Prevention, Denmark’s Agreement on Recycling of Transport Packaging and the 
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Dutch National Environmental Plan, among several others.
1  Voluntary agreements are thought 
to have a number of advantages over traditional regulation. Firms may enjoy significant cost-
savings from having increased flexibility in deciding how to meet an environmental target 
(Baggot 1986; Goodin 1986). Furthermore, voluntary agreements may help reduce the time 
necessary to develop traditional forms of regulation and may reduce conflicts between regulators 
and firms that often occur in this process (Segerson and Miceli 1998).  Finally, some authors 
have suggested that voluntary agreements are likely to be cheaper to enforce than traditional 
regulations (Bailey 1999; Schmelzer 1999; Brouhle et al. 2005; Croci 2005). 
While the theoretical literature on the performance of voluntary approaches to 
environmental regulation has progressed quite far in the last decade, no one has rigorously 
addressed the obvious point that voluntary environmental agreements with industries must be 
enforced, either by the government, or by the industry itself. This paper examines the 
consequences of enforcement costs that are borne by the members of voluntary agreements on 
the ability of these agreements to meet regulatory objectives, the levels of voluntary participation 
with these agreements, the relative costs of enforcing voluntary agreements and conventional 
regulations, and the relative efficiency of voluntary and regulatory approaches. 
Most existing theoretical analyses of voluntary agreements model simple agreements 
made between the government and a single firm, or a series of independent agreements with an 
arbitrary number of firms (Segerson and Miceli 1998; Segerson and Miceli 1999; Schmelzer 
1999; Nyborg 2000; Lyon and Maxwell 2003).
2  Modeling voluntary agreements in this way 
                                                 
1 For reviews of voluntary agreements in Europe and the United States see EEA (1997), Mazurek (1998), Brouhle et 
al. (2005), and Schnabl (2005). 
2 The main conclusion of these studies is that voluntary approaches are most likely to meet environmental targets 
when there is a strong background threat of costly mandatory regulation.  The limited empirical evidence on 
voluntary agreements largely supports this claim (Davies and Mazurek 1996; Khanna and Damon 1999; Lyon and 
Maxwell 2002; Maxwell 2000; Maxwell, Lyon and Hackett 2000; Alberini and Segerson 2002).   
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precludes the important possibility that an environmental agreement with an industry may 
involve only a subset of firms while the remaining firms free ride.  Recently, Dawson and 
Segerson (2007) examine the causes and consequences of this free-riding problem. In their 
model, a regulator offers an industry the opportunity to voluntarily meet an aggregate emissions 
target instead of imposing an emissions tax that would meet the target. To determine the 
equilibrium number of participating firms with a voluntary agreement, Dawson and Segerson use 
the concept of self-enforcing agreements that was developed to examine stable cartels 
(D’Aspremont et al. 1983; Diamontoudi 2005) and is used extensively in the literature on 
international environmental agreements (e.g., Carraro and Siniscalco 1993; Barrett 1994; Kolstad 
2007). Dawson and Segerson demonstrate that voluntary agreements can meet environmental 
quality goals, but they will typically involve less than full participation of the firms in an 
industry. Because some firms free-ride on the emission control of other firms, voluntary 
agreements cannot be expected to distribute emission control responsibilities efficiently.   
Though widely used, the term self-enforcing agreement is a bit misleading, because it 
refers to the stability of voluntary agreements, not to maintaining the compliance of the members 
of an agreement. Like most authors who use this equilibrium concept, Dawson and Segerson 
assume that once a self-enforcing agreement has formed, the members of the agreement will not 
violate its requirements. Building from their model, we examine a voluntary agreement made 
between a government and industry in which firms that join the agreement have an incentive to 
violate its requirements if it is not properly enforced.. To counteract this incentive, we assume 
that the members of an agreement not only agree to reduce their emissions so that the regulatory 
objective is achieved, they also finance and empower an independent enforcer to monitor their 
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performance and to apply a sanction when it discovers a member firm has failed to meet its 
emissions control requirement.  
  Our efforts yield several new results.  First, while the model of Dawson and Segerson 
predicts that voluntary agreements can always meet a regulatory objective in place of an 
emissions tax, we demonstrate that enforcement costs that are borne by the members of an 
agreement limit the circumstances under which voluntary emission control agreements can form. 
Surprisingly, however, if an agreement does form, member-financed enforcement induces 
greater participation than if compliance with the agreement could be enforced without cost, or if 
the enforcement costs are borne by the government.  
  We also address the claim that voluntary agreements may be cheaper to enforce than 
traditional regulation.  Bailey (1999) speculates that this may be true, because only the subset of 
firms that join a voluntary agreement need to be monitored. Others predict a cost savings because 
of expected advantages an industry-led enforcement scheme has over government enforcement 
(Schmelzer 1999).  For example, it is possible that an enforcer of a voluntary agreement has 
better information than the government about firms’ incentives and could therefore monitor their 
compliance behavior more effectively.  Additionally, industry-led enforcement may be capable 
of imposing higher penalties for noncompliance, for example, by revoking the membership of 
noncompliant firms in trade associations (Nyborg 2000). 
  We demonstrate that a voluntary agreement is not cheaper to enforce than an emissions 
tax when the enforcer of the agreement possesses the same monitoring technology and sanction 
as the government. Voluntary agreements are cheaper to enforce only if the enforcer of such an 
agreement has an advantage over the government in its ability to monitor participating firms and 
the sanctions it can levy on noncompliant parties. Moreover, we show that it is always possible 
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that an independent enforcer of a voluntary agreement has a large enough advantage over the 
government that a voluntary agreement with member-financed enforcement can achieve an 
industry-wide emissions target more efficiently than an emissions tax.  In these cases, the 
enforcement cost advantage of a voluntary agreement is greater than the loss from the inefficient 
distribution of emissions control responsibilities that Dawson and Segerson identify.   
  We also consider the possibility that government enforcement of a voluntary agreement is 
more efficient than member-financed enforcement. Voluntary agreements that are enforced by 
the government can be more efficient than those with member-financed enforcement, but only if 
the government’s enforcement capabilities are significantly better than those of an alternative 
enforcer.  However, we also show that there are no situations in which government-enforced 
voluntary agreements are more efficient than an emissions tax.  Thus, our results suggest that 
voluntary emissions control agreements with industries can be an efficient means of achieving 
environmental quality goals, but only if: (1) the members of an agreement bear the costs of 
enforcing compliance with the agreement; (2) there exist member-financed agreements that reach 
the government’s environmental quality target while leaving the members of the agreement at 
least as well off as they would be under an emissions tax, and (3) the enforcer of an agreement 
has a significantly better monitoring technology or a higher sanction available to it than the 
government.  
        
2. Voluntary environmental agreements that do not require member-financed enforcement 
Although Dawson and Segerson (2007) probably intended to assume away enforcement issues 
and their costs, one can interpret their results as arising from a model of a self-enforcing 
environmental agreement for which the government takes on the burden of enforcing compliance 
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with the requirements of the agreement. In this section we present a somewhat simplified version 
of Dawson and Segerson’s model of a self-enforcing environmental agreement to highlight the 
structure of these games, and to provide a baseline for our model of voluntary agreements with 
member-financed enforcement.  
 
2.1 Basic setup 
Following Dawson and Segerson (2007), we limit our analysis to an industry of n identical firms 
that emit a uniformly mixed pollutant. Each firm possesses a strictly concave profit function  
   ,         [ 1 ]   ()
2 () / 2 eb e b πβ ′′ =+− e
where ,  and    bb β ′′ are positive constants and e denotes the emissions level of each firm.
 3 We 
specify the form of the profit function to ease our computations in later sections of the paper. 
Absent an incentive to control its emissions, the firm chooses its emissions so that  () 0 e π′ = , 
yielding   
   .           [ 2 ]   /
u eb b ′′ =
 (The superscript u identifies uncontrolled emissions). The firm’s profit when it is not motivated 
to control its emissions is  
     .        [ 3 ]   (
2 () / 2
u eb πβ ′′ =+ ) b
                                                
  Suppose that the government seeks to reduce industry emissions by charging a per unit 
emissions tax t.  Under the tax, each firm chooses its emissions to maximize  
     ,        [ 4 ]   ()
2 () / 2 et e b eb et e πβ ′′ −=+− −
resulting in individual emissions 
 
3  A firm’s profit function π(e) describes its profit when its emissions are e and it makes all of its other input and 
output choices optimally.  
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    .          [ 5 ]     () ( )/ et b t b ′′ =−
For most of our analysis we consider taxes such that 0 tb < < .  Focusing on positive tax rates 
simply means that we are concerned with situations in which the government wishes to reduce 
the industry’s emissions.  Choosing tax rates below b means that we are mainly interested in 
situations in which the government does not seek a complete ban on the industry’s emissions.
4   
  Substituting [5] into [1] gives us each firm’s gross profit under the tax:  
   () (() ) ( ) ( )/2 te t b t b t π πβ == + − + .        [ 6 ]    
Substituting  into [3] yields each firm’s profit net of their tax payment:  () ( )/ et b t b ′′ =−
  
2 () () ( ) /2 te t t b t b πβ ′′ −= + − .       [ 7 ]    
  Of course, a uniform emissions tax will lead to the distribution of emission control in the 
industry that maximizes industry profit, given that aggregate emissions are limited to  
.  The main contributions of Dawson and Segerson are that an aggregate 
emission target can always be achieved with a voluntary agreement, but that such an agreement 
will likely involve only a subset of firms who control their emissions while the remaining firms 
do not.  Consequently, voluntary emissions control agreements with industries will not distribute 
individual emissions control efficiently.  We now turn to the model of a self-enforcing agreement 
that produces this result.  
() ( )/ ne t n b t b′′ =−
  
2.2 A self-enforcing voluntary agreement 
Suppose the government is willing to not impose the emissions tax if the industry can reach the 
desired level of emissions, , through a voluntary emissions control agreement. Because  () ne t
                                                 
4 We demonstrate later that a voluntary control agreement without member-financed enforcement that reduces 
industry emissions to zero can form, but it must include all firms in the industry. However, an agreement with 
member-financed enforcement cannot form to achieve a complete ban on the industry’s emissions.   
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participation in the agreement is voluntary, individual firms freely choose whether they will 
become a member of the agreement.  Participation with a voluntary agreement is modeled as a 
two-stage game.  In the first stage, each firm decides independently whether to join the 
agreement.  In the second stage, all firms choose their levels of emissions. Those who indicate 
that they will not join an agreement in the first stage choose their uncontrolled levels,  , in the 
second stage.  In contrast, the members of the agreement commit to individual emissions 
standards that limit the entire industry’s emissions to the government’s aggregate target, 
provided that they can do so while remaining at least as well off as they would be under the 
emissions tax.  If these conditions are met, then the government does not impose the tax and each 
member of the agreement holds their emissions to their agreed upon standard. These standards 
are chosen by the agreement members to maximize their joint profit, which, since the firms are 
identical, implies that they agree to uniform emission standards. If the firms that join a voluntary 
agreement in the first stage of the game cannot reduce their emissions far enough to meet the 
government’s industry-wide target, or they are able to do so but they would be worse off than 
under the emission tax, they do not follow through with an agreement to reduce their emissions 
to meet the government’s target. In response the government imposes the emissions tax.   
u e
  The game is solved by backward induction.  Let s denote the number of members of a 
voluntary agreement. To ease the exposition and later calculations, we assume that the number of 
firms is large enough so that s can be treated as a continuous variable.
5  Given s members of an 
agreement, let  denote the emissions standard that is required of each member of the 
agreement.  Since nonmembers release their uncontrolled level of emissions  , aggregate 
(,) est
u e
                                                 
5 All of the main results of this paper hold if we assume that s is a discrete variable. Making s discrete would make 
the analysis significantly messier without substantially improving our understanding of the issues.  
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emissions are  .   In stage 2, therefore, an agreement with s members can meet 
the government’s emissions target if and only if  
( , ) ( )
u se s t n s e +−
   .         [ 8 ]   (,) ( ) ()
u se s t n s e ne t +− ≤
Actually, the weak inequality in [8] can be replaced with strict equality, because there are no 
circumstances under which the members of a voluntary agreement will reduce their emissions so 
that industry emissions are lower than the government’s target. The uniform emissions standard 
required of each member of a voluntary agreement to make sure that industry emissions are 
equal to the government’s target is determined by letting  [8] hold with equality, substituting 
 and   from [2] and [5], and solving for :  () ( )/ et b t b ′′ =− /
u eb b ′′ = (,) est
   (,) ( ) . est s b n t s b ′′ =−          [ 9 ]  
Note that   if and only if . Therefore, voluntary agreements with participation 
levels in the interval [/  can meet the government’s target, but agreements with less than 
 members cannot, even if each of them reduced their emissions to zero.   
(,) 0 est ≥ / sn t b ≥
, ] nt b n
/ nt b
 Given / s nt ,  note that  is increasing in the number of members of an 
agreement, but is decreasing in the emissions tax.  More members implies that the burden of 
holding industry emissions to ne(t) is distributed among more firms.  On the other hand, a higher 
emissions tax implies that the government is trying to induce a lower aggregate standard. Thus, 
given a fixed membership in a voluntary agreement, each member of the agreement must reduce 
its emission further to achieve the government’s goal. 
b ≥ (,) est
  Now let us turn to the profit levels of the members and nonmembers of a voluntary 
agreement when its members are able to satisfy the government’s aggregate emissions target.  
For  , let denote the profit for each member of a voluntary agreement with s  / sn t b ≥ ()
nc
m s π
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members. (The subscript m indicates that the firm is a member of the agreement, while the 
superscript nc indicates that compliance with the agreement is enforced at no cost to its 






Lemma 1: For , the profit for each firm in a voluntary emission control agreement 
that does not require member-financed enforcement is  
















        [ 1 0 ]  
with the following characteristics: 
 (i)  ;  (/ ) ( ) (
nc
m sn t b t e t t ππ =< − )
(ii)   () 0
nc
m ss π ∂∂ > ; 
(iii)  ( ) [ () ()] ( ) 0
nc
m sn t e t t t bt b ππ ′′ =− − = − > ;  
(iv)  .  () ( )
nc u
m se ππ <
 
The graph of   is provided in Figure 1.  At the lower bound of s for which an 




/ sn t b = , the profit for each member of an 
agreement is strictly less than their profit under the tax (i).  However,   increases with s (ii) 






m s π () () te t t π −  if all firms become members of 
the agreement (iii).  In fact, if all firms join a voluntary agreement their individual emissions 
would be the same as under the tax, so that the difference between  (
nc
m sn π ) =  and  () () te t t π −  is 
simply their individual tax payments. Of course, avoiding these taxes is the motivation to form a 
voluntary agreement in the first place. Note, however, that the profit of any firm that refuses to 
join a voluntary agreement,  , will always be higher than the profit of a member of the  ( )
u e π
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agreement (iv), simply because nonmembers do not control their emissions. Therefore, while it is 
clear that the incentive and opportunity exist to form a cooperative agreement to avoid the 
emissions tax, it is also quite clear that every firm is motivated to free-ride on efforts to do so.  
Note in Figure 1 that there exist coalitions that are profitable in the sense that each 
member of these coalitions is at least as well off as under the emissions tax.  Use [10] and [7] to 
solve   for s to obtain the smallest of these coalitions:  () () ()
nc
m st e t ππ =− t
    min (2 ).
nc sn t b t =−
s
          [ 1 1 ]  
Since voluntary emissions control agreements form only when their members find them 
profitable, if   firms join an agreement in the first stage of the game, each of them reduces 
their emissions to  , defined by [9].  However, if   firms join in the first stage, they 
would be better off by simply accepting the emissions tax.  In this case, they will not follow 
through with emissions standards to satisfy the government’s aggregate goal, and the 





To determine the number of firms that will join a voluntary emissions control agreement 
in the first stage, Dawson and Segerson (2006) adopt the equilibrium concept of a self-enforcing 
agreement that is employed in the study of cartels (D’Aspremont et al. 1983), and international 
environmental agreements (Barrett 1994; Kolstad 2007).  Let s
nc denote the equilibrium number 
of members of a voluntary environmental agreement that does not require member-financed 
enforcement. The definition of a self-enforcing voluntary agreement in this setting is:  
 
Definition: A voluntary emissions control agreement consisting of s
nc firms that do not bear the 
costs of enforcing the agreement is self-enforcing if and only if: 
 ( i)  ;  min min ( ) ( )  i f   ,  a n d   ( ) () () i f  
nc nc u nc nc nc nc
mm se s s st e t t s ππ ππ ≥> ≥ − =
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 ( ii)  .          [ 1 2 ]   () ( 1 )
un c n c
m es ππ ≥+
 
Requirement (i) of a self-enforcing voluntary agreement is the internal stability condition that no 
member of the agreement has an incentive to leave the agreement, while requirement (ii) is the 
external stability condition that no nonmember wishes to join the agreement.  Dawson and 
Segerson (2006) prove that a self-enforcing voluntary emission control agreement always exists, 
and that the only internally and externally stable voluntary agreement is the one with   
members.  These conclusions also hold for our version of their model. 
min
nc nc ss =
 
Proposition 1:  A self-enforcing voluntary emissions control agreement that does not require 
member-financed enforcement always exists.  The equilibrium number of members of such an 
agreement is  
min (2 ).
nc nc ss n t b t == −         [ 1 3 ]  
 
  It is easy to show why this proposition holds, so we do not offer a formal proof.  A self-
enforcing agreement always exists as long as profitable agreements exist.  Figure 1 clearly 
illustrates that all coalitions involving memberships greater than or equal to   are profitable. 
To see why the only self-enforcing number of members of a voluntary agreement is   , note 
first that if  , then at least one member of   could leave the agreement to earn the free-
riding payoff,  , without having the agreement collapse. Thus, no coalitions with 
more than   members are internally stable.  However, a coalition with exactly   members 
is internally stable, because one fewer member would leave the remaining members worse off 
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would be imposed on all firms. Finally, an agreement with   members is externally 
stable. No nonmember would join this agreement, because they earn more by free riding. 
min
nc nc ss =
  In the self-enforcing equilibrium, members of the agreement earn just what they would 
under the emissions tax while nonmembers earn the free-riding payoff.  Thus, industry profits are 
strictly greater under voluntary emission control than under the emissions tax. However, Dawson 
and Segerson show that a voluntary agreement cannot be efficient.  In the absence of 
enforcement costs, the efficient allocation of pollution control maximizes the industry’s 
aggregate gross profit given that aggregate emissions are equal to the government’s target.  With 
identical firms this requires that all firms reduce their emission to the same level.  Under a 
voluntary agreement, however, only the members of the agreement reduce their emissions. Thus, 
Dawson and Segerson conclude that if the government wishes to achieve an environmental 
quality objective efficiently, it would never prefer voluntary control of emissions to an emissions 
tax.
6   
  It is clear, however, that the concept of a self-enforcing agreement is concerned with the 
stability of a cooperating coalition, not with the members’ decisions to comply with their 
commitments once they’ve joined.  If firms’ emissions are not easily observed and the 
government’s decision to allow a voluntary agreement is not easily reversed, then a firm may be 
motivated to join an agreement to help forestall the emissions tax, but decide not to reduce its 
emissions to the extent required under the agreement. Thus, a more realistic model of a voluntary 
                                                 
6 To illustrate this result, subtract aggregate profit under the voluntary agreement,   () ( ) ( )
nc nc nc u nc
p s se n s ππ +− , from 
aggregate gross profit under the emissions tax,  () nt π  to obtain        
  ( )( )
3/2 1/2 () ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 2 0 .
nc nc nc u nc
m nt ss ens n t b btt ππ π ′′ ⎡⎤ −+ − = − − ⎣⎦ >  
The sign follows from the fact that b  makes  t >
1/2 2bt t −> .  Note, however, that setting b = t to achieve of 
complete ban on emissions makes a voluntary agreement and the emissions tax equally efficient. This is because the 
self-enforcing agreement to achieve a ban on industry emissions requires the participation of all firms in the 
industry. To see this, note from [13] that  min
nc nc s sn = =  when b = t.  
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emissions control agreement should include an enforcement dimension. Moreover, the relative 
costs of enforcing a voluntary agreement and enforcing an emissions tax, as well as who bears 
the costs of enforcing the agreement, will impact the relative efficiency of these agreements. In 
the next section we extend Dawson and Segerson’s (2007) model to include member-financing 
of an independent enforcer who is responsible for maintaining compliance with the terms of a 
voluntary emissions control agreement. 
 
3.  Voluntary environmental agreements with member-financed enforcement 
We now give the members of a voluntary emissions control agreement the opportunity to violate 
the emissions standard specified under the agreement.  To counteract the incentive toward 
noncompliance the members of an agreement fund an independent enforcer who monitors the 
firms’ emissions and applies a penalty when it finds a violation. 
  As before the model is analyzed as a stage game, but now the game has four stages.  The 
first stage (membership stage) is the same as before, that is, each firm chooses independently 
whether to join a voluntary agreement.  In stage two (agreement stage), member firms jointly 
agree on whether to reduce their emissions to meet the government’s emissions target. If they 
agree to meet the target, each of them contributes sufficient funds to the enforcer to maintain 
their compliance with the agreement’s emissions standard. If this occurs, the government does 
not impose the emissions tax. If the agreement members jointly decide not to meet the 
government’s target in stage two (or cannot because of lack of participation), they do not fund 
the enforcer, an effective agreement does not form, the government imposes the emissions tax, 
and the game ends. (Throughout, we refer to an effective voluntary agreement as one that 
actually leads to voluntary achievement of the aggregate emissions target in place of an 
  15 
emissions tax).  If an agreement forms in stage two, both members and nonmembers of the 
agreement independently choose their emissions in stage three (emissions stage).  Finally, in the 
fourth stage (enforcement stage) the enforcer of the agreement randomly audits the emissions of 
member firms with the funding provided to it in the second stage, and applies a sanction when a 
violation is discovered.  Since the agreement, emissions, and enforcement stages are new with 
this study, we need to describe them in more detail.  Because the game is solved by backward 
induction, we start with the last stage.  
 
3.1 Enforcement stage 
If the game reaches this stage a voluntary agreement with s members has formed, they have 
agreed to reduce their emissions to meet the government’s target, each of them has made a 
contribution to fund the enforcer, and all firms have chosen their emissions.  In the enforcement 
stage, the monitor randomly audits the emissions of the agreement members and applies a 
sanction in cases of noncompliance.  
  The monitoring technology of the independent enforcer is specified in a straightforward 
manner.  Monitoring consists of   random audits of the members.  An audit of a firm reveals 
its compliance status without error.  If each member of the agreement contributes x to the 
enforcer, it can audit 
as ≤
as x α =  members, where α  is interpreted as the constant marginal 
productivity of enforcement resources in producing audits.  Since audits are random, the 
probability that any one firm will be audited is 
     / as x . ρ α ==        [ 1 4 ]  
Note that given a fixed contribution by each member of the agreement, increasing the number of 
members does not change the audit probability because each additional member contributes 
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enough to keep that probability constant.  However, we will see shortly that the contribution of 
each member, and hence the audit probability, will depend on the number of members.  
Moreover, we will demonstrate exactly what is required to make (0,1] ρ ∈ .  
  A member of a voluntary agreement is noncompliant when its emissions exceed the 
emissions standard that is necessary for the member firms to meet the government’s aggregate 
target.  Recall that this standard is   from equation [9].  If the enforcer finds a firm in 
violation it imposes a unit fine of f on
(,) est
(,) 0 ee s t − > .  Note that each firms faces the expected 
marginal penalty  fx f ρ α = .  The fine is constrained to be no more than  f . 
 
3.2 Emissions stage 
At this point in the game the members of a voluntary agreement have agreed to reduce their 
emissions to meet the government’s target and have funded the enforcer.  In the emissions stage 
both members of the agreement and nonmembers independently choose their emissions. 
Nonmembers have no incentive to control their emissions, so they each choose their uncontrolled 
levels e
u specified by [2].  Member firms, however, hold their emissions to e(s, t) if and only if 
the agreement is enforced adequately. To simplify the analysis, we restrict ourselves to 
enforcement strategies that guarantee full compliance by the members of the agreement.
7  
  Assume that the firms are risk neutral and that members of an agreement comply with its 
emissions standard if they are at least indifferent between compliance and noncompliance. Each 
of them chooses their emissions to maximize their expected net profit; that is, they solve  
  m a x () ( (,) ) ,     . .   (,) . e e f e est ste est π ρ −− ≥       [ 1 5 ]  
                                                 
7 One can envision a voluntary agreement that reaches the government’s aggregate emissions target despite allowing 
a certain amount of noncompliance by its members. It is not clear, however, that there is any gain in doing so over 
an agreement with sufficient enforcement to induce full compliance.  
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The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for a solution to [15] are  () 0 ef π ρ ′ − ≤ ,  (,) 0 ee s t − ≥ , and 
[( ) ] [ ( , ) ]0 . ef e e s t π ρ ′ −−=  These conditions indicate that all parties will comply with the 
standard as long as ((,) ) fe s t ρ π′ ≥ ; that is, as long as the expected marginal penalty for violating 
the standard is not less than a firm’s marginal profit evaluated at the standard. This guarantees 
that a firm’s marginal benefit from noncompliance— () e π′ for  — is never greater than 
the expected marginal penalty.   
(,) ee s t ≥
  Since monitoring is costly, the members of the agreement will provide sufficient funds to 
the enforcer in stage two of the game so that it can induce full compliance with minimal 
monitoring. This requires ((,) ) fe s t ρ π′ = , yielding the audit probability  ((,) ) / est f ρ π′ = .  Use 
[1] and [9] to calculate  ((,) ) est π′  and substitute the result into  ((,) ) / est f ρ π′ =  to obtain 
   / nt . sf ρ =           [ 1 6 ]  
Clearly,  is a necessary condition for an effective voluntary agreement.  If this condition 
did not hold, then the enforcer would not be able to maintain compliance with the agreement, 
even if it audited each of its members.  Note that the combination of low sanctions and lack of 
participation can prevent the formation of a voluntary agreement.  For the remainder of this 
analysis we assume that to allow an effective agreement to form.  
nt sf ≤
nt sf ≤
Not surprisingly,ρ  is decreasing in the fine.  More interestingly, it is also decreasing in 
the number of members of the agreement.  Recall that  (,) ( ) est s b n t s b ′′ = −  is increasing in s, 
reflecting the fact that the individual burden of meeting the government’s target is reduced if an 
agreement contains more members.  That  ((,) ) est π′  is then decreasing in s tells us that an 
individual member’s incentive to violate the agreement’s standard is reduced as the number of 
members is increased.  Consequently, the minimum audit probability that is necessary to 
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maintain full compliance can be reduced. On the other hand, an increase in the threatened tax 
implies that the government’s aggregate emissions target is lower. Members of an agreement 
must then reduce their emissions further. Since they each have a greater incentive to violate a 
lower standard, the audit probability required to maintain their compliance must increase as the 
emissions tax is increased.  
 
3.3 Agreement stage 
The firms that agree to join a voluntary emissions control agreement in the first stage agree to 
reduce their emissions to meet the government’s target and fund the enforcer in the agreement 
stage as long as these decisions maximize their joint welfare. It is important to note that firms 
cannot credibly commit to reducing their emissions in this stage because their emissions are only 
revealed later if they are audited.  In the agreement stage member firms only state that they will 
reduce their emissions in the emissions (third) stage.  On the other hand, the individual payments 
to the enforcer are easily observed.  To preclude the possibility that a firm can agree to make this 
payment and then fail to do so, we require that the payment be made in this stage if an effective 
agreement forms.  
  To determine the payment each member of an effective voluntary agreement makes to the 
enforcer, combine [16] and [14] and solve for x to obtain / x nt s f α = .  Since x is monotonically 
decreasing in the fine for noncompliance, the members of the agreement will all agree that the 
fine should be as high as possible; that is,  f f = .
8  Thus, the contribution to the enforcer of an 
effective agreement with s members is  
                                                 
8 The idea that the penalty for noncompliance should be set as high as possible to conserve monitoring costs when 
agents are risk neutral is common in the literature on the economics of law enforcement. See Polinsky and Shavell 
(2000) for a review of this literature. 
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    () / . x sn t s f α =         [ 1 7 ]  
The required payment is decreasing in the number of members of the agreement and increasing 
in the tax, simply because the minimum audit probability that is required to maintain compliance 
with an effective agreement (given by equation [16]) is also decreasing in the number of 
members and increasing in the tax. 
  Members of a voluntary agreement will agree to a uniform emissions standard to meet the 
government’s target and to fund the enforcer if and only if they are at least as well off as under 
the emission tax; that is, the agreement must be profitable for each of its members.  We explore 
the profitability of voluntary agreements with member-financed enforcement thoroughly in the 
next section.  For now, let us just say that profitability depends on the number of firms that 
decide to join the agreement in the first stage of the game (i.e., the membership stage).  If a 
sufficient number of firms join the agreement in the first stage, they will agree to an emissions 
standard to meet the government’s target and fund the enforcer in the second. In response, the 
government does not impose the emissions tax. Since funds for the enforcer are sufficient to 
guarantee full compliance, in the third stage each member complies with the agreed-upon 
standard.  In the fourth stage the enforcer conducts its random audits of the members’ emissions, 
but finds no violations.  On the other hand, if too few firms join the agreement in the first stage, 
the agreement will not be profitable. The members then do not agree to control their emissions, 
there is no need to fund the enforcer, and the government imposes the tax on all firms.  
 
4. Equilibrium voluntary agreements that require member-financed enforcement 
The subgame perfect equilibrium of the stage game we’ve just described is either a self-
enforcing agreement under which all members of the agreement limit their emissions to meet the 
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government’s aggregate target, or an effective agreement does not form and the government 
imposes the emissions tax.  In this section we derive the equilibrium number of members of a 
self-enforcing voluntary agreement with member-financed enforcement and compare it to the 
equilibrium obtained under the assumption that an agreement does not require member-financed 
enforcement.  We begin by examining the profitability requirement of voluntary emissions 
control agreements with member-financed enforcement. 
 
4.1 Profitable voluntary agreements 
Recall from subsection 2.1 that to reach the government’s aggregate emissions target, each 
member of a voluntary agreement must hold their emissions to e(s, t) defined by [9], which they 
are able to do if and only if  . Otherwise, an effective agreement cannot form.    
Moreover, recall from [16] and the discussion that followed that to guarantee that the enforcer of 
an agreement can maintain compliance with its emissions standard we also need 
/ sn t b ≥
nt sf ≤ , or 
/ sn tf ≥ ,.  To focus on situations in which an effective agreement with member-financed 
enforcement can actually form, we limit our analysis to agreements with memberships 
max( / , / ), sn t b n t f ⎡⎤ ∈⎣⎦ n . 
  The profit of each member of a voluntary agreement consists of its gross profit from 
holding its emissions to e(s, t) minus its payment to the enforcer x(s) defined by [17].  For 
max( / , / ), sn t b n t f ⎡ n ∈⎣ ()
c
m s π ⎤ ⎦ , let denote the profit for each member of a voluntary agreement 
that requires member-financed enforcement. (The superscript c indicates that compliance with an 
agreement requires member-financed enforcement). The following lemma specifies   and 
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Lemma 2: For max( / , / ), sn t b n t f ⎡ ∈⎣ n ⎤ ⎦ , the profit for each firm in a voluntary emissions 















=− = + −
′′
,      [18] 
with the following characteristics: 
i)   ;  () ()
cn c
mm ss ππ <
ii)  () 0
c
m ss π ∂∂ >
t
; 
iii) there exist s such that   if and only if  () () ()
c
m st e t ππ ≥− () bt b f α ′′ −≥ . 
 
  Not surprisingly, [18] indicates that, for a given s, the difference between the profit of the 
members of an agreement that does not require member-financed enforcement and the profit of 
the members of an agreement with member-financed enforcement is simply the payment the 
members of the latter form of agreement pay to fund its enforcer. This implies that the profit of 
each member of an agreement with member-financed enforcement is less for every level of s 
(part i).  Equally unsurprising is the fact that the profit of each member of an agreement is 
increasing in the number of members (part ii).  Part iii) is much more interesting, because it 
reveals whether profitable agreements with member-financed enforcement actually exist.
9 Recall 
from section 2 that profitable agreements that do not require member-financed enforcement 
always exist. However, there is nothing in the model with member-financed enforcement that 
requires or implies () bt b f α ′′ −≥ .  Since only a profitable agreement can form in place of an 
emissions tax, we have our first conclusion about the impact of member-financed enforcement 
on self-enforcing voluntary emissions control agreements. 
 
                                                 
9 In the very special case that () bt b f α ′′ −= , the only profitable agreement is the one that contains all of the firms 
in the industry (i.e., s = n). 
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Proposition 2: The circumstances under which an effective voluntary emission control 
agreement can form are diminished by enforcement costs that are borne by the members of an 
agreement.  
 
 That  () bt b f α ′′ −≥  is required for an effective agreement reveals that the costs of 
enforcement can be sufficiently high to prevent an agreement from forming.  Loosely, the 
likelihood that an agreement can form is reduced as the marginal productivity of monitoring 
resources, α , or the size of the maximum available sanction,  f , is reduced. Reducing either of 
these parameters increases the payment to the enforcer required of all agreement members, 
which leads to a decrease in the set of opportunities for an effective agreement.  
 
4.2 A self-enforcing voluntary agreement that requires member-financed enforcement 
Like the model of self-enforcing voluntary agreements without member-financed enforcement in 
section 2, a self-enforcing agreement with member-financed enforcement must be both internally 
and externally stable.  Again like the model of section 2, it is easy to show that the only 
internally and externally stable coalition size is the smallest profitable coalition, provided that a 
profitable coalition actually exists From Lemma 2 and the discussion that followed, profitable 
agreements with member-financed enforcement exist if and only if () bt b f α ′′ −≥ .  Under this 




() ( 2 )




nb n b f b t t





′′ ′′ ++ −
⎡⎤ == − = ⎣⎦−
.       [19] 
Therefore, we have: 
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Proposition 3: Let   be the equilibrium number of members of a self-enforcing voluntary 





() / bt b f α ′′ −≥ .  If () / bt b f α ′′ −< , then a voluntary agreement will not form and 
the government will impose the emissions tax.  
 
  Comparing [19] to [13] reveals clearly that member-financed enforcement of effective 
voluntary agreements changes the self-enforcing number of members of these agreements. To 
see how, subtract [13] from [19] to obtain:   
 
22 () ( 2 ) ( 2 )
(2 )





′′ ′′ ++ − − −
−=
−
.     [20] 
To sign this expression note that it is increasing in b′′ and is equal to zero when   Since we 
assume    . This proves our next proposition. 
0. b′′ =
0, b′′ > 0
cn c ss −>
 
Proposition 4: If an effective voluntary emission control agreement with member-financed 
enforcement forms, the number of members of the agreement will be greater than under a 
voluntary agreement that does not require member-financed enforcement.  
 
The reason for this result is straightforward.  Since contributing to the enforcement of a 
voluntary agreement is an additional cost of joining one, more firms are required to participate to 
make the agreement profitable.   
  Figure 2 illustrates the main differences between effective agreements that require 
member-financed enforcement and those that do not.  We have graphed   along with a 








From Lemma 2,   is monotonically increasing in s and the vertical difference between  ()
c
m s π
                                                 
10 Note that we assume that  max( / , / ) / nt b nt f nt b =  so that  [ ] /, s nt b n ∈ .  
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()
nc
m s π  and   is simply the payment each member of a costly-to-enforce agreement pays to 




() bt b f α ′′ −≥  so that profitable agreements exist.
11  
From Proposition 3, the smallest of these profitable coalitions, s
c, is the equilibrium number of 
members of an effective agreement that requires member-financed enforcement.  That s
c > s
nc in 
Figure 2 clearly illustrates Proposition 4.   
  When a voluntary agreement that requires member-financed enforcement forms the 
number of free-riders on the agreement will be less than if the agreement did not require costly 
enforcement, or if the government enforced the agreement. Recall that Dawson and Segerson 
(2007) showed that free-riding makes voluntary agreements inefficient in the sense that 
aggregate industry profit at the government’s aggregate emissions target is not maximized.  
Since free-riding is reduced when agreement members finance their own enforcement, the 
inefficiency associated with free-riding is also less.  But whether an effective voluntary 
agreement with member-financed enforcement can ever be more efficient than an emissions tax 
requires that we include the relative costs of enforcing voluntary agreements and emissions taxes 
in a welfare comparison of the two policy approaches.  The relative efficiency of voluntary 
emissions control agreements and emissions taxes is the topic of the next section.  
 
5.  The relative efficiency of voluntary environmental agreements  
5.1 The cost of enforcing an emissions tax 
To compare the relative efficiency of a voluntary agreement and an emissions tax, we first need 
to derive the cost of enforcing a tax.  Under an emissions tax, each firm in the industry is 
                                                 
11 If () / bt b f α ′′ −< , then  ()
c
m s π  would lie below  () () te t t π −  for each s, and no profitable agreement would exists. 
In the special case that () / bt b f α ′′ −= ,  ()
c
m s π  would lie below  () () te t t π − , except at  s = n.   
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required to submit a report of its emissions, r, and it is noncompliant if it attempts to evade some 
part of its tax liability by reporting re < .  After the firms release their emissions and submit 
their emission reports, the government randomly audits the emissions of some subset of the firms 
so that the probability that any one of them is audited is
g ρ .  (The superscript g identifies 
parameters and variables associated with the government’s enforcement capabilities.  In general, 
these will be different from those of an independent enforcer of a voluntary agreement).  If a firm 
is audited and their reported emissions are lower than their actual emissions, the firm is fined 
g g f f ≤  per unit of  .  As with the enforcement of a voluntary agreement, we assume 
that government enforces the emissions tax so that all firms are compliant.
0 er −>
12  
  Assuming for simplicity that firms always choose positive emissions, a risk neutral firm 
chooses its actual and reported emissions to maximize 
   .     [21]  () ( ) ,   s . t .  0
gg et r fe r e r πρ −− − ≥≥
The constraint   is imposed because a firm will never have an incentive to over-report its 
emissions.   Let L denote the Lagrange equation for [21] and let 
0 er −≥
λ  denote the multiplier 
attached to the constraint  .  Then, the following first-order conditions are both necessary 
and sufficient to determine the firm’s choices of emissions and emissions report:  
0 er −≥
           [ 2 2 ]   () 0 ;
gg
e ef πρλ ′ =− + = L
0, 0,  ( ) 0;
gg gg
r tf rr tf ρλ ρλ =− + − ≤ ≥ − − = L        [23] 
   0,  0,  ( ) 0. er er λ λ λ =−≥ ≥ − = L        [ 2 4 ]  
                                                 
12 Contributions to the theoretical literature on compliance and enforcement of emissions taxes include Harford 
(1978 and 1987), Sandmo (2002), Cremer and Gahvari (2002), and Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (2006). 
Recently, Stranlund et al (2007) argue that it is normally efficient to enforce emissions taxes so that firms are 
compliant if the costs of sanctioning noncompliant firms are greater than the costs of collecting tax revenue.  
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Under the assumption that a firm will comply if it is indifferent between compliance and 
noncompliance, [23] and [24] reveal that inducing truthful reporting requires that the tax not 
exceed the expected marginal penalty for under-reported emissions; that is, 
g g tf ρ ≤ .  If the 
inequality was reversed, the firm would report zero emissions because it would be cheaper to 
face the expected penalty than to pay the tax.  Moreover, to minimize the monitoring costs of 
inducing full compliance, the government sets the fine at its maximum level,
g g f f = , and 
monitors so that 
g g tf ρ = .  Finally, since  0 re = > , [23] becomes  0. r = L  Then, combining [22] 
and [23] yields  () et π′ = .  Using a firm’s profit function,  () e π defined by [1], each firm’s gross 
profit under the tax is defined by [5] and its profit net of its tax payment is defined by [7].  
  In enforcing the emission tax the government has the same sort of linear monitoring 
technology as the independent enforcer of an alternative voluntary agreement.  Let () x t denote the 
per-firm amount of money the government spends on auditing firms under the tax. If the 
marginal productivity of monitoring resources is the constant 
g α , then the audit probability each 
firm faces is  .  Moreover, since the government audits just enough 
firms so that 
( )/ ( )
gg g nx t n x t ρα α ==
g g tf ρ = , the per-firm cost of enforcing the emissions tax is  ()
g g x tt f α = , and 
aggregate enforcement costs are 
    ()
g g nx t nt f α = .           [ 2 5 ]  
  
5.2 Can a voluntary emissions control agreement be more efficient than an emissions tax? 
Before we turn to a full specification of the efficiency of a voluntary agreement relative to an 
emission tax, we first explore the issue of whether a voluntary agreement can be enforced more 
cheaply than a tax as suggested by Bailey (1999), Schmelzer (1999), and Nyborg (2000).  Use 
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[25] and [17] to calculate the difference between the cost of enforcing a voluntary agreement and 
the cost of enforcing an emissions tax: 




nx t s x s
f f αα
−= − .       [26] 
Clearly, if the enforcer of a voluntary agreement and the government have identical monitoring 
technologies and available sanctions, then there is no difference in the costs of enforcing a 
voluntary agreement and an emissions tax that induce the same aggregate emissions. There are 
two equal but opposing forces at work here.  Given an audit probability, the number of firms that 
need to be audited under a voluntary agreement is less than under an emissions tax, because only 
a subset of the firms operate under the agreement.  On the other hand, monitoring costs are 
higher under a voluntary agreement because each member firm is required to reduce its 
emissions to a lower level than under the emissions tax; hence, they need to be monitored more 
closely to offset the greater incentive to be noncompliant.   
  Except in the special case that s
c = n,  if the enforcer of the agreement and the 
government have the same enforcement capabilities, a voluntary agreement with member-
financed enforcement will not be a more efficient policy than an emissions tax simply because 
these agreements fail to allocate individual emissions control efficiently.
13  Therefore, if it is 
possible that a voluntary approach can outperform an emissions tax when s
c < n, the enforcer of 
the agreement has to be significantly better at monitoring firms’ emissions than the government 
(i.e., 
g α α > ), or it must be able to impose significantly higher penalties (
g f f > ), or some 
combination of the two that makes 
g g f f αα > .  We now explore this possibility.  
                                                 
13 In the case that  
c s n = , if the costs of enforcing the voluntary agreement and the emissions tax are the same, then 
the voluntary approach and the tax are equally efficient, because there is no free-riding loss under the voluntary 
approach.  
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  Our welfare measure is aggregate industry profit less the aggregate cost of enforcement. 
This value is   under the emissions tax.  Note that we are assuming that tax 
revenue is a simple transfer with no real effects.  Aggregate welfare under the voluntary 
agreement with member-financed enforcement is  .  Recall from 
[18] that   includes the payment a member of a voluntary agreement must make to the 
enforcer of the agreement; hence,   includes the total cost of enforcing an agreement.  The 
difference between welfare under the emissions tax and the voluntary agreement is  
( ) ( )
t Vn tn x t π =−
() () ( )
cc c c u c





   () () ( ) ( ) ( ).
tc c c c u c
m VV n tn x t s s en s ππ π ⎡ ⎤ −= − − + − ⎣ ⎦      [27] 
Upon substitution of  () t π  from [6],  from [25], s () nx t
c from [19],   from [18], and   
from [2], we have:   
()
c








nt n s nt nt
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g g .       [28] 
  Note that the second and third terms of [28] capture the difference between the cost of 
enforcing the voluntary agreement and the cost of enforcing the emissions tax (see [26]). The 
first term, which is non-negative because  , is the gain in aggregate gross profit of the 
industry under the emissions tax over the voluntary agreement, because there is no free-riding 
loss under the emission tax.  Equation [28] reveals clearly that   if 
c ns ≥
tc VV >
g g f f αα =  
and .
c ns >
14  Just as clearly, if the government has the enforcement advantage so that 
g g f f αα < , then a voluntary agreement with member-financed enforcement will never be more 
efficient than an emissions tax. However, our next proposition reveals that it is always possible 
                                                 
14 This is simply a formal demonstration of our earlier statement that if the enforcer of a voluntary agreement and 
the government have the same monitoring technology and sanction, an emissions tax is a more efficient way to 
achieve an aggregate emissions target than a voluntary agreement that involves only a subset of the firms. 
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that the enforcer of the voluntary agreement has enough of an advantage over the government to 
make a voluntary agreement more efficient than an emissions tax. In these cases, the saving in 
enforcement costs over the costs of enforcing an emissions tax is greater than the free-riding loss 
that plagues voluntary agreements.  Proposition 5 is proved in the appendix. 
 
Proposition 5: An effective voluntary agreement with member-financed enforcement is more 
efficient than an emissions tax if and only if  ( )
0 gg gg f f αα < , where ( )
0 gg f α  is the unique 
solution to   and is strictly positive and strictly less than 
t VV =
c f α .  
 
  Our conclusion that it is always possible that a voluntary agreement is more efficient than 
an emissions tax comes from the fact that the cut-off value, ( )
0 gg f α , in Proposition 5 is strictly 
greater than zero. In the proof of the proposition we show that 
t VV
c − is monotonically 
increasing in 
g g f α  and   when 
t VV >
c g g f f αα = .  Therefore, there is a value of 
g g f α  at 
which  , which is 
t VV =
c (
0 gg ) f α .  If this value was negative, then we would have  for 
all positive values of 
tc VV >
g g f α , and a voluntary agreement could never outperform an emissions tax. 
That it is positive implies that there is a range of positive values of 
g g f α  for which a voluntary 
agreement is more efficient than an emissions tax. That values in this range are strictly less than 
f α  indicates that a voluntary agreement can only be more efficient than an emission tax when 
the enforcer of the agreement has a significant advantage over the government in its monitoring 
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5.3 Should the government enforce voluntary emissions control agreements? 
We have one final issue to deal with. Throughout most of the paper we have assumed that the 
members of a voluntary agreement finance the enforcement of the emissions standard they agree 
to.  One could envision, however, a situation in which the government allows a voluntary 
agreement in place of an emission tax and takes on the burden of enforcing the agreement.  In 
this subsection we examine the efficiency of government enforcement of a voluntary agreement. 
  In our review of Dawson and Segerson’s (2007) model in section 2, we noted that one 
could interpret their model as one in which the government enforcers the requirements of an 
agreement. Thus, when the government enforces a voluntary agreement the equilibrium number 
of members of the agreement is s
nc defined in Proposition 1, and the per-firm profit of the 
members of the agreement is  , where   is specified in Lemma 1.  Hence, aggregate 
profit when the government enforces a voluntary agreement is  .  The 
government maintains the compliance of the members of the agreement with its monitoring 
parameter and maximum fine, 
()
nc nc
m s π ()
nc
m s π
() ( ) (
nc nc nc u nc
m ss ens ππ +− )
g α  and 
g f .  Using [17], the government’s total cost of enforcing 
the agreement is  ( )
nc nc x ss =
g g nt f α .  Let us denote the value of a voluntary agreement that is 
enforced by the government as  . Then, 
/ cg V
  
/ () ( ) ( )
c g nc nc nc u nc g g
m Vs s e n s n t ππ α =+ − − f
s
.    [29] 
Recall that aggregate welfare under a voluntary agreement with member-financed enforcement is 
.    () () ( )
cc c c u c
m Vs s e n ππ =+ −
  Our last proposition reveals that while it may be more efficient for the government to 
enforce a voluntary agreement, it is always more efficient for it to impose the emissions tax 
instead.  The proof is in the appendix.  
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Proposition 6: Government enforcement of a voluntary environmental agreement is more 
efficient than member-financed enforcement if and only if 
g g f α  exceeds ()
1 gg f f α α > , where 
( )
1 gg f α  is the unique solution to 
/ 0.
cc g VV − =   However, it is always more efficient for the 
government to impose the emissions tax than to allow a voluntary agreement that it enforces.  
 
  Proposition 6 suggests that it is possible that government enforcement of a voluntary 
agreement is more efficient than member-financed enforcement, but only if the government is 
significantly better at enforcement. The reason for this result is that participation with a 
voluntary agreement is less when the government takes on the enforcement costs than when 
these costs are borne by the members of an agreement. Thus, free-riding and its associated loss 
are greater when the government bears the enforcement costs. The government’s enforcement 
advantage must then be large enough to overcome this extra loss if it is to be more efficient for it 
to enforce a voluntary agreement than to insist that the members of the agreement bear the 
enforcement costs. However, a voluntary agreement that the government enforces is never more 
efficient than an emissions tax.  Hence, if the government is motivated by the efficient 
achievement of an environmental quality goal, it should never allow a voluntary agreement 
among polluting firms that it intends to enforce.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Voluntary agreements made between the government and industries are increasingly being 
considered as viable alternatives to more traditional forms of environmental regulation.  These 
approaches are often credited with a number of cost-saving advantages over traditional 
regulations, including the possibility that they are cheaper to enforce. To our knowledge we are 
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the first to model compliance with the requirements of voluntary agreements and the costs of 
enforcing these requirements rigorously. Clearly, any analysis of the relative efficiency of 
voluntary versus regulatory approaches must address the relative costs of enforcing the two 
approaches, and who bears the costs of enforcing voluntary agreements.  
  Our efforts have provided several new results that have significant relevance for our 
understanding of the efficacy and efficiency of voluntary emissions control agreements. When 
firms that participate in a voluntary control agreement finance an independent enforcer to 
maintain compliance with the agreement, the circumstances under which a voluntary agreement 
can form in place of an emissions tax are diminished.  However, when such an agreement does 
form, more firms will participate in the agreement than if the agreement could be enforced 
without cost, or if the government took on the costs of enforcing the agreement.  In general, an 
environmental agreement with member-financed enforcement is not cheaper to enforce than an 
emissions tax that achieves the same level of environmental quality. However, it is always 
possible that an independent enforcer of a voluntary agreement has enough of an advantage over 
the government that a voluntary agreement with member-financed enforcement is a more 
efficient means of achieving an environmental quality target than an emissions tax.  Finally, we 
have shown that there are no circumstances under which the government should take on the costs 
of enforcing a voluntary agreement, because government-enforced agreements are always less 
efficient than an emissions tax.  
  In short, our results suggest that voluntary emissions control agreements can be a more 
efficient way to meet environmental quality targets than emission taxes, but only if: (1) members 
of an agreement bear the costs of enforcing compliance with the agreement; (2) there exists 
member-financed agreements that reach the government’s environmental quality target while 
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leaving the members of the agreement at least as well off as they would be under an emissions 
tax, and (3) the enforcer of a voluntary agreement has significantly better monitoring capabilities 
or higher sanctions available to it than the government. 
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Lemma 1: Substitute [9] into [1] to obtain [10].   
(i)  Substitute s = nt/b into to obtain  ()
nc
m s π (/ )
nc
m sn t b . π β = =   
(ii) Since  (/ )
nc
m sn t b π β ==  and, from [7],  ( )
2 () () ( ) 2 te t t b t b πβ ′′ −= + −  it is clear that  
 under our assumption that b .   (/ ) ( ) (
nc
m sn t b t e t t ππ =< − ) t >
(iii) From [10], 
23 () 0
nc
m sn ts b π ′′ ∂∂ = > .  
(iv) Substitute s = n into and simplify to obtain  ()
nc
m s π ( ) () ( ) ( ) 2
nc
m sn bt bt b πβ ′′ == + − + . 
Subtract [7] from this to obtain  () 0 tb t b . ′′ −>  The sign follows from our assumption that b .   t >





() () ( ) ( ) 2
nc
m sn bt bt b πβ ′′ == + − + . From [2],  ( )
2 () 2
u eb πβ ′′ =+ b
)
. Subtract  
 from to obtain  (
nc
m sn π = ( )
u e π
2 2 tb0 ′′ > . Therefore for all s. QED.  () ( )
nc u
m se ππ <
 
Proof of Lemma 2: Substituting e(s, t) from [9] into [1] yields   defined in Lemma 1 by 
equation [10]. Therefore,  . Substituting   from [10] and x(s) from [17] 






mm ss x ππ =− s ()
nc
m s π
i) Since, from [17],  () / 0 xs n t s f α => ,  .   () ()
cn c
mm ss ππ <
ii) From [18] obtain 
23 2 () ( )/ / 0
nc
m s s nt s b nt s f πα ′′ ∂∂ = + > . 
iii) Substitute s = n into [18] and subtract [7] from the result to obtain 
() () [ ( ) ( ) ] ( )
c
m sn t e t t t b bt b f ππ ′′ ′′ α ⎡ ⎤ =− − = − − ⎣ ⎦ . 
Clearly,   if and only if  () ( ) (
c
m sn t e t t ππ =≥ −) () bt b f α ′′ −≥ . Obviously, there exist s such that 
if  () () ()
c
m st e t t ππ ≥− () bt b f α ′′ −≥ . If () bt b f α ′′ −< ,  . Then, since 
is increasing in s,   for all s if 
() ( ) (
c
m sn t e t t ππ =< −)
t ()
c
m s π () () ()
c
m st e t ππ <− () bt b f α ′′ −< . QED. 
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Proof of Proposition 5: From [28] note that 
t VV
c −  is monotonically increasing in 
g g f α . 
Therefore, given  f α  (with corresponding s
c) and the fact that   when 
t VV >
c g g f f αα = , there 
exists a value for 
g g f α  that is strictly less than  f α   at which 
t VV
c = .  This value of  
g g f α  is  

















Given the structure of  ,    for 
tc VV −
t VV <
c () ( )
0
0,




0 gg gg ) f f αα ≥ . QED.    
 
Proof of Proposition 6: Recall that a member of a voluntary agreement earns equivalent profits 
under an emissions tax; that is,  . (See Figure 2 to confirm this).  
Use this relationship and subtract   from   to obtain 
( ) ( ) () ()
c c nc nc




/ () () ( )
cc g c n c u
g g
nt




⎡⎤ −= − −− + ⎣⎦ .      [30] 
Use [3] and [7] to calculate  () () ( ) ( 2 )2
u tt e t e t b tb ππ ′′ −− = −− . Substitute this along with 








bn n b f t b t n f t b t tbt n t
VV
f bt b f
αα
αα
⎡⎤ ′′ ′′ ++ − − − − ⎛⎞ −= − + ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ ′′ − ⎝⎠ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
.   [31] 
Note that   is monotonically decreasing in 
/ cc VV −
g g g f α .  
  Now let us evaluate   at 
/ cc VV −
g gg f f α α = .  Making this substitution in [31] and 
simplifying the result yields 
/ 2
cc g VV A n t bf α ′′ −= , where 
 
22 (2 ) ( ) (2 ) A bf t b tb f t b αα ′′ ′′ =+ −− + − t . 
Clearly,   at 
/ 0
cc g VV −>
gg f f α α =  if and only if  , which occurs if   0 A>
 
22 (2 ) ( ) (2 ) bf t b tb f t b αα ′′ ′′ +− > + t − .       [32] 
Since both sides of [32] are strictly positive, we can square them and maintain the inequality. 
Doing so yields 2( 2 ) bf t b t α ′′ −> 0 . The inequality holds because all the parameters in 
2( 2 bf t b t α ′′ − )  are positive and  . Therefore   and  bt > 0 A>
/ 0
cc g VV − >  at 
gg f f α α = . 
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Thus, when the government and an independent enforcer of a voluntary agreement have the same 
enforcement capabilities, member-financing of an independent enforcer is more efficient than 
government enforcement of a voluntary agreement.  
 However,  since   is monotonically decreasing in 
/ cc VV −
g g g f α  and is positive at 
gg f f α α = , there exists a unique value of 
g g f α  that is strictly greater than  f α  at which 
. Denote this value as 
/ 0
cc g VV −= ( )
1 gg f α . Clearly, 
/ 0
cc g VV − >  if  (
1 gg gg ) f f αα <  , but 
 if 
/ 0
cc g VV −< ()
1 gg gg f f αα > .  
  Finally, we need to show that it is more efficient for the government to impose an 
emissions tax than to allow a voluntary agreement that it will enforce. Recall that our welfare 
measure under the emissions tax is  .  Substitute  ( ) ( )
t Vn tn x t π =− ()
g g nx t nt f α =  from [25] 
into   and subtract the result from [29] to obtain: 
t V
   . 
/ () ( ) () () ( )
tc g u u n VV t en te t t es ππ π π ⎡⎤ ⎡ −= − − −− ⎣⎦ ⎣
c ⎤ ⎦
Use [3] and [6] to calculate 
2 () ( ) 2 0
u tet b ππ ′′ −= −< . Then use [5] to calculate 
() () ( ) ( 2 )2
u te t t e t b tb ππ ′′ −− = − − . Substitute these into   to obtain 
/ tc VV −
g
/ (2 ) 2
tc g n c VV t b t s t n b ′′ ⎡ −= −− ⎣
2 ⎤ ⎦ , and then use [13] to substitute for s
nc to obtain 
() (
/3 22
tc g VV b t t n t b ′′ −= − − )
/ 2 . Clearly, 
/ 0
tc g VV − >  if and only if  2bt t −> . 
Squaring both sides of this last relationship and simplifying yields   Since this inequality 
holds by assumption,  . Thus, it is more efficient for the government to impose the 
tax than to allow a voluntary agreement that it enforces. QED. 
. bt >
/ 0
tc g VV −>
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Figure 1: Individual profit under a voluntary environmental agreement that does not 
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Figure 2: Individual profit under voluntary agreements with member-financed 
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